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The following is an interview carried out by Mr. Gil Grein--an undergraduate in Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University's Science, Technology, and Globalization program and an IBPP Research 
Associate--with Dr. Nadav Morag, a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University. 
 
Grein: How different would an early pull-out (Israeli forces from southern Lebanon) be from the 
scheduled July pull-out? What are some of the positives and negatives of an early/scheduled 
withdrawal? 
 
Professor Morag: The question about advantages or disadvantages of an early withdrawal is kind of a 
moot point in view of the surprise withdrawal of last night--ultimately not that surprising given the 
military's fear that soldiers might be trapped at outposts given the general collapse of the security zone 
in the past few days. The advantage to an early withdrawal is the ability to pull out the troops and 
expose them to a minimum of hostile fire, and not necessitate sending in large forces to rescue them. 
This, in fact, is what occurred as the troops were evacuated safely. 
 
The disadvantage of last night's move is threefold: 1) It hurts the country's military image because the 
withdrawal appears to be a total defeat at the hands of the victorious Hezbollah rather than a decision 
to cut losses and pull out in the hopes of imp roving the tactical situation as well as gaining international 
political support. 2) It allows the Hezbollah, rather than the UN [United Nations] or the Lebanese Army, 
to take up evacuated IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] and SLA [Southern Lebanese Army] positions thus 
bringing the guerrilla army right up to Israel's border. 3) It created chaos vis a vis the members and 
dependents of the SLA thus putting Israel in a moral bind and creating a situation in which Israel has 
abandoned a large number of its erstwhile allies. This does not bode well for other elements in the Arab 
world (such as among the Palestinians) who might want to collaborate with Israel and may thus hurt 
Israel's critically important intelligence gathering capability. These disadvantages, while more numerous, 
do not necessarily outweigh the benefits of pulling the troops out without any loss of life. 
 
Grein: What do you predict Hezbollah’s role will be after Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon? 
 
Professor Morag: My guess is that Hezbollah will undertake some provocative attacks against Israel in 
the short run in order to show that it has not given up the struggle and because it will be difficult for 
Hezbollah to make the transition from a guerrilla army to a Lebanese political party and social 
organization. Ultimately, if Hezbollah keeps attacking Israel and Israel retaliates (as it has promised) thus 
making life difficult for the Lebanese and undermining stability and economic development in the 
country--which would not be good for the Syrians either--it will lose a lot of the patriotic support that it 
now enjoys among the some of the Lebanese. I think that the Lebanese will want peace and quiet more 
than anything else, and they will ultimately blame Hezbollah if its actions bring about devastating Israeli 
retaliatory air strikes. It would seem therefore to be the case that Hezbollah does not have an inherent 
interest in continuing to fight Israel--although individuals factions within the organization may accuse 
the leadership of having gone soft if it does not act against Israel and this may generate some limited 
momentum for a few more armed actions. 
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This is not the case, by the way, with respect to various Palestinian terrorist factions who, with Syrian 
support, may begin attacking Israel. Israel's destruction of Jibril's [Ahmed Jibril of the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine - General Command] tanks in Syrian-occupied Lebanon was meant as a 
message to the Palestinian factions and Syria that Israel will respond in force to any Palestinian attacks. 
 
As for Hezbollah, I think that it will focus its efforts on gaining control of Lebanese politics (the Shi'ites 
are, after all, the single largest ethnic group in the country). I can definitely foresee a time (perhaps a 
decade away) where Hezbollah will take their guns out of the mothballs and turn them on the Syrians as 
occupiers of Lebanon. If this happens and there is a more or less peaceful situation between Hezbollah 
and Israel, it would not be surprising for Hezbollah to turn to Israel for arms and support. Stranger things 
have happened in politics. 
 
Grein: With many SLA members and their families seeking refuge in Israel, what kind of Issues/problems 
do you foresee arising within their "community" once they are brought into Israel? What kind of 
Issues/problems regarding this transplanted "community" will the Israeli government have to deal with? 
 
Professor Morag: According to news reports, some 4,000 SLA members and their families have thus far 
arrived in Israel. The authorities suggest that, when things quiet down, most will return home. However, 
assuming that most elect to stay for security and/or economic reasons, absorbing them into Israeli 
society will not be easy--and not because of the Jewish majority. Assuming that they overcome their 
feeling that Israel has betrayed them (and who can blame them for feeling this way?) and are loyal to 
the state, the Israeli-Jewish majority will have absolutely no problem with their absorption. They may be 
allocated land to build their own village(s) or may try to live in existing Arab villages. If they do the latter 
however, there will be a bi g problem as the Israeli Arab population will most likely be uniformly hostile 
to them because of the fact that they collaborated with Israel against Hezbollah and the Lebanese 
government. There has been an ongoing row with the Israeli Arabs regarding Israel's attempts to settle 
Palestinian collaborators in Israeli Arab towns and villages and there is no reason to think that SLA 
personnel and dependents will not receive a similar "welcome" from Israeli Arabs. 
 
Grein: Will the absence of Israeli occupation in Lebanon strengthen or weaken Syria's and Israel's 
position regarding the Golan Heights? 
 
Professor Morag: This is the million dollar question. I think that in the long run there will be quiet (more 
or less) along the northern border and this will be unquestionably bad for the Syrians. Syria has been 
able to use attacks against Israeli soldiers as a way of pressuring Israel to make concessions [concerning] 
the Golan Heights. This was effective to a point and indeed both the Rabin and Barak governments (and 
probably Netanyahu's as well) were willing to concede all of the strategic plateau for peace with Syria 
and Lebanon (and an orderly withdrawal from the Security Zone). However, Syrian inability to make 
what would be seen as concessions [concerning] Lake Tiberias or military deployment (for a range of 
reasons I won't get into here) really meant that Israel was left to risk a unilateral withdrawal. If Syria is 
unable to use the Palestinian groups or anybody else to continue the conflict with Israel, they will have 
very little in the way of tools that can be used to pressure Israel --unless they want to risk an all-out 
conflict (which is unlikely unless the regime will feel severely threatened by domestic opponents and 
might embark upon a war as a way of saving itself). (Keywords: Grein, Israel, Lebanon, Morag.) 
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